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Abstract
There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collu-
sion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally
recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the in-
troduction of an LP has on horizontal MS acquisitions. Using data from 63 countries over the
period 1990-2013, we find a large increase in horizontal MS acquisitions in the year in which an
LP is introduced, especially in large rivals. The effect is present however only in countries with
an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption and only when the acquisitions
involve stakes of 10%− 20%. These results suggest that MS acquisitions may stabilize collusive
agreements that were destabilized by the introduction of the LP.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing concern in recent years about the potential anticompetitive effects of partial
cross ownership among rival firms, that is, cases in which firms acquire minority stakes (MS) in
actual or potential rivals.1 For instance, a 2014 European commission white paper argues that “The
Commission’s experience, the experiences of Member States and third countries, but also economic
research show that in some instances the acquisition of a noncontrolling minority stake, such as
one firm acquiring a 25% stake in a competitor, can harm competition and consumers” (European
Commission, 2014). A similar concern was voiced by the OECD in a 2008 policy roundtable:
“Minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates can have negative effects on competition, either
by reducing the minority shareholder’s incentives to compete (unilateral effects), or by facilitating
collusion (coordinated effects)” (OECD, 2008).
Despite this growing concern, merger regulations do not apply in many jurisdictions when
the acquisition does not give the acquirer control over the target firm, and in fact, the competition
authority is not even aware of the acquisitions in many cases.2 But even when merger regulations
apply, MS acquisitions, especially those deemed to be “passive,” are either granted a de facto exemp-
tion from antitrust liability or have gone unchallenged by the competition authority (Gilo, 2000).3
For example, Nain and Wang (2016) find that in the U.S., where the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice have the competence to review MS acquisitions, less than 1% of all MS
transactions are challenged, and even fewer are blocked.
The Industrial Organization literature has shown that MS acquisitions may raise competitive
concerns due to unilateral and coordinated effects.4 Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Bresnahan and
Salop (1986), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and Shelegia and Spiegel (2012) show that following an MS
acquisition in a rival, the acquirer softens its competitive behavior, because it internalizes some of
the competitive externality it imposes on the rival.5 The anticompetitive effects of MS acquisitions
could be even larger if the acquisition gives the acquirer some degree of control over the target firm,
because then the acquirer can also soften the target’s behavior in addition to its own behavior.
In fact, Salop and O’Brien (2000) argue that MS acquisitions could lead to even less competitive
outcomes than full horizontal mergers if the acquirer’s control rights substantially exceed its cash
1There is also a growing concern about common ownership: cases where the same set of shareholders own several
competing firms. Recent papers by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2016), and Azar, Raina, and Schmalz (2016) show that
airline ticket prices and bank fees are significantly higher when competing firms are held by the same institutional
investors, such as Berkshire Hathaway, BlackRock, and Vanguard. Panayides and Thomas (2017) study data from 119
U.S. industries over the period 1997-2014 and find that common ownership by institutional investors (blockholders)
is associated with higher industry profitability, due to reduced expenditures.
2In some countries including Austria, Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.S., and the UK, competition authorities
have the competence to review MS acquisitions that raise competition concerns. See European Commission (2014).
For a comprehensive review of antitrust policies concerning MS acquisitions, see Fotis and Zevgolis (2016).
3Gilo (2000) argues that the lenient approach towards passive investments in rivals in the U.S. stems from the
courts’ interpretation of the exemption for stock acquisitions “solely for investment” included in Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
4See European Commission (2013) and O’Brien and Waehrer (2017) for recent literature surveys.
5Interestingly, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that in the context of a Cournot model, the acquirer’s softer
behavior induces rivals to expand their output; if rivals are more efficient than the acquirer, the output shift can
actually enhance welfare. Brito, Cabral and Vasconcelos (2014) study the welfare effects of different forms of a
divestiture of a firm’s partial ownership in a rival.
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flow rights.6
Malueg (1992), Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink (2000), and Gilo, Moshe, and Spiegel
(2006) show that MS acquisitions can also facilitate tacit collusion. The reason is that when firms
hold MS in rivals, they internalize part of the negative competitive externality that they impose
on rivals when they deviate from a collusive agreement. Although MS may also soften competition
once a collusive agreement breaks down and hence weaken the incentive to collude, the first effect
typically dominates, so firms have a stronger incentive to collude.7,8
Despite the increasing concern about the competitive effects of MS acquisitions, empirical
evidence on these effects is still scarce. Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink (2000) use cross own-
ership data from the Dutch financial sector to calibrate oligopoly models with constant marginal
costs. They conclude that the price-cost margins in the Dutch financial sector are 8% higher in a
Cournot model and 2% higher in a differentiated goods, price competition, model than they would
be absent cross-ownership. Brito, Ribeiro, and Vasconcelos (2014) propose a methodology to eval-
uate the unilateral effects of partial cross ownership and apply it to several MS acquisitions in the
wet shaving industry. Among other things, they estimate that Gillette’s acquisition of a 22.9%
nonvoting equity interest in Wilkinson Sword in 1990 had only a negligible negative effect on prices,
but a counterfactual acquisition of a 22.9% voting equity would have led to a 2.1%− 2.7% increase
in the price of Wilkinson Sword wet shaving razor blades. Nain and Wang (2016) find in a study of
774 horizontal MS acquisitions in U.S. manufacturing industries announced in 1980-2010 that the
acquisitions raised prices by 2% and raised price-cost margins by 0.7%, even after controlling for
other factors that may have affected prices and price cost margins.
In this paper, we wish to shed light on the competitive effects of MS acquisitions and in
particular, examine whether they facilitate collusion. As far as we know, there is still no empirical
evidence on the effects of MS acquisitions on the ability of firms to collude (tacitly or explicitly).
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that it is generally accepted that leniency programs (LP),
which offer amnesty from government penalties to corporations and individuals who come forward
and disclose information about illegal antitrust activity, such as price-fixing, and fully cooperate
with subsequent investigations, can destabilize collusive agreements. Indeed, following the U.S. lead
in 1993, many countries have introduced an LP precisely in order to detect existing cartels and
deter new collusive agreements.9 Hence, once an LP is introduced, firms would need to stabilize
6Intuitively, the acquirer may then have an incentive to use his control rights to soften the target’s behavior (by
setting high prices or low quantities) in order to boost the profits of his own firm. The resulting outcome could be
less competitive than under a full horizontal merger, where the acquirer cares equally about the profits of both firms.
Foros, Kind, and Shaffer (2011) show that when the acquirer fully controls the target, a partial ownership stake may
be more profitable than full ownership because then the acquirer chooses a softer stragety for the target than under
full ownership. If the two firms compete with a rival and strategies are strategic complements, the rival also softens
its behavior in a way that may benefit the acquirer.
7Malueg (1992) shows in a symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which firms hold the same ownership stakes, v, in one
another, that the second effect may dominate the first, in which case an increase in v hinders collusion rather than
facilitates it. But if this were the case, firms would not wish to increase v, so we should not observe such an outcome.
8While MS typically soften competition, they may also have a bright side. Lopez and Vives (2016) (general
oligopoly model with symmetric cross or common ownership structure) and Shelegia and Spiegel (2016) (Bertrand
duopoly with asymmetric cross-ownership structure) show that MS in rivals may encourage cost-reducing investments.
9For a review of LPs in different countries, see OECD (2012) and UNCTAD (2010).
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their collusive agreements; acquiring MS in rivals is one way of doing it. Accordingly, we examine
whether the introduction of an LP encourages MS acquisitions.
To this end, we construct a panel data set that covers 63 countries, of which 54 have
introduced a national LP between 1990 and 2013. Applying count data models, we find robust
evidence that in the year in which a national LP is introduced in a given country, there is a large
and significant increase in the number and volume of horizontal MS acquisitions between firms based
in that country. This effect holds, however, only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement
and a low level of corruption. Otherwise, the introduction of an LP has no significant effect on MS
acquisitions, presumably because the national LP is not perceived by colluding firms as an effective
threat. We also find that the effect is present when investing in large firms and when the acquired
stake gives the acquirer a 10%− 20% share in the target firm; such stakes are significant in size, but
normally do not trigger merger notification.10
Following the pioneering paper of Motta and Polo (2003), a large and growing theoretical
and experimental literature has emerged which examines the competitive effects of LPs (see Spagnolo
and Marvao (2016) for a recent literature review). This literature shows that LPs affect competition
in several ways and that in general they hinder collusion. In Harrington (2008), an LP has three
distinct effects on collusion: the “Deviator Amnesty” effect hinders collusion because it allows a
deviating firm to apply for leniency at the same time it undercuts the collusive price and hence it
lowers the cost of cheating. The “Race to the Courthouse” effect destabilizes collusive agreements
because each firm is concerned that another cartel member would apply for leniency and hence it
is better off doing so first. Finally, the “Cartel Amnesty” effect is a countervailing force since the
ability of each firm to apply for leniency in the future, if needed, lowers the cost of joining the cartel
in the first place.11 Harrington shows that when an LP is optimally designed, the first two effects
dominate the third, meaning that LPs hinder collusion. Harrington and Chang (2009) explore the
interaction between the three effects of LPs in the context of a dynamic model in which cartels form
and collapse on the equilibrium path. They show that the introduction of an LP reduces the long-
run frequency of cartels and raises the rate at which they are discovered. Harrington (2013) shows
that when each cartel member has private information about the likelihood that the competition
authority will be able to convict the cartel without a cooperating firm, an LP can also destabilize
the cartel due to a “Preemption” effect, which arises because each firm fears that another firm may
believe that the probability of detection is high, and will apply for amnesty. Hence, firms may wish
to apply for amnesty to preempt rivals from doing so.
The empirical literature on LPs largely confirms the theoretical prediction that LPs hinder
collusion. For instance, Levenstein and Suslow (2011), Abrantes-Metz et al. (2013), De (2010),
Zhou (2012, 2016), and Hellwig and Hu¨schelrath (2017) show that the introduction of an LP has a
10See OECD (2008): in most countries, an MS acquisition triggers the requirement for a merger notification only
when it results in joint control, i.e., the right to block major decisions within the target.
11Polo and Motta (2003) also show that an LP might, under some conditions, facilitate collusion because the
possibility of reporting and receiving immunity from fines reduces the expected costs of cartel detection and conviction.
Likewise, Harrington and Chang (2013) find that an LP can result in more cartels, although they identify situations
and policies a competition authority can pursue that make it more likely that an LP will hinder collusion.
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significantly negative effect on the duration of detected cartels.12 Miller (2009) develops a theoretical
model of cartel behavior and uses it to identify the effect of a LP on cartel formation and detection
rates. He finds that the number of cartel discoveries increased immediately after a new LP was
introduced in the U.S. in August 1993, but then fell below initial levels. The latter is consistent
with the notion that LPs deter cartel formation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our empirical
strategy and in Section 3 we present our data. The estimation results are in Section 4 and in Section
5 we show robustness checks. We conclude in Section 6. The Appendix contains additional tables
that are not included in the main text.
2 Empirical Strategy
To examine empirically the effects of MS on collusion, we will use the introduction of a national
LP in a given country as an exogenous shock, which destabilize collusive agreements between firms
located in that country. The idea is that faced with this negative shock, colluding firms may wish to
resort to MS acquisition, as a way to stabilize their collusive agreements. While firms may use MS as
a collusive device even before an LP is in place, an MS acquisition is typically costly due to various
transaction costs, and if the shares are acquired from atomistic shareholders, the acquirer makes no
money on the acquired shares.13 Consequently, it is reasonable to expect firms to be reluctant to
acquire MS in rivals if they have other means to sustain collusion. Since the introduction of an LP
destabilizes collusive agreements, it makes firms more willing to acquire MS in rivals, which suggests
in turn that the introduction of a national LP would be followed by an increase in MS acquisitions
in rival firms. If the intention of firms is only to stabilize existing agreements, the increase in
MS acquisitions would be immediate and short-term. If the intention is to facilitate new collusive
agreements, we should observe a permanent increase in MS acquisitions following the introduction
of an LP.
The idea of using the introduction of an LP as a negative shock to collusive agreements was
first used by Sovinsky and Helland (2012). They argue that the 1993 revision of the U.S. LP and its
adjustment in 1995 have reduced the gains from collusive relationships in the form of research joint
ventures (RJV). They find a significant drop in the probability of joining an RJV after 1993: 34%
among telecommunications firms, 33% among computer and semiconductor manufacturers, and 27%
among petroleum refining firms. Dong, Massa, and Zaldokas (2016) show that the introduction of
LPs in 63 countries between 1990 and 2012 led to more cartel convictions and lower average gross
margins of affected firms, and moreover, was followed by an increase of takeovers and mergers with
rivals.14 In a similar vein, Marx and Zhou (2015) find that the EC’s LP, first introduced in 1996,
12Brenner (2009) is an exception: he does not find evidence that the EU LP destabilized cartels. But as Spagnolo
and Marvao (2016) argue, Brenner’s analysis refers to the first version of the EU LP, which was poorly designed and
was revised in 2002 and 2006. Later empirical studies - that are able to take the first (or even both) revision(s) into
account - find clear empirical support for a destabilizing impact of LPs.
13This is due to Grossman and Hart’s (1980) well-known free-rider problem.
14Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2015) also study the relationship between cartels and mergers, although
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had a significant and robust large positive effect on mergers. They also find that the EC’s cartel
settlement procedure in 2008, which allows late confessors to obtain fine reductions outside the LP,
had a significant large negative effect on mergers, presumably because it lowered the cost of collusion
and made mergers less attractive compared to collusion. Unlike the last two papers, which examine
mergers and acquisitions, we are interested in the effect of LPs on MS acquisitions as an indirect
evidence for the proposition that MS facilitate collusion.
To this end, we use a panel of 63 countries over the period 1990-2013, and estimate the
following count data model:
MSit = exp(αLPit + βXit + ξi + ξt + εit),
where MSit is a measure of MS acquisitions of rivals in country i in year t, LPit is a vector of
dummies several years before and after year t in which an LP was introduced in country i, Xit is
a vector of macroeconomic and financial markets control variables, ξi is country fixed effect, ξt is
a year fixed effect, and εit is a noise term. In some specifications we replace LPit by LPit× Yi,
where Yi reflects two country-specific indices that control for the efficacy of antitrust enforcement
and the level of corruption in country i. We control for these factors because in countries with
ineffective antitrust enforcement and/or high levels of corruption, an LP is unlikely to destabilize
collusive agreements, and hence may not trigger the need to resort to MS acquisitions. We therefore
expect to see more MS acquisitions following the introduction of LPs only in countries with effective
antitrust enforcement and/or low levels of corruption.
We include the vector Xit in our estimation to control, at least partially, for various forces
that may drive MS acquisitions beside the desire to soften competition. For example, Meadowcroft
and Thompson (1986) study UK data and find that about 25% of all MS are acquired as a first step
in a planned takeover or to block a takeover by a third party, 15% are due to diversification motives
into new sectors, and about 30% are intended to support trading agreements.15 Allen and Phillips
(2000) and Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) show that MS can mitigate incomplete contracts and
thereby facilitate cooperation between independent firms, while Parker Ouimet (2013) finds that MS
acquisitions are more common when it is efficient to keep the target’s managerial incentives intact,
and when the acquirer wishes to provide the target with financing or certify it to outside investors.
We wish to examine whether the introduction of a national LP has an effect on MS acquisitions even
after these additional forces are controlled for.
In general, a count data model could be estimated with a (Quasi-Maximum Likelihood)
Poisson model or with a Negative Binomial model. The Poisson model however is inappropriate for
our data since we have significant Poisson overdispersion: when estimated by Poisson, the resulting
they examine merger after cartel breakdowns rather than after the introduction of an LP. Using a pooled sample of
84 European cartels, they find that mergers are more frequent post-cartel breakdown, especially in less concentrated
markets. This finding is consistent with the notion that mergers are an attempt to re-establish collusive behavior,
although they may be also driven by other considerations, such as the need for market restructuring, due to more
intense post-cartel competition.
15Jovanovic and Wey (2014) study a model in the MS acquisition is a first step towards a full merger.
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conditional variance is approximately four times larger than the variance implied by a Poisson
distribution.16 We will therefore apply negative binomial estimation. This choice is supported by
model fit test presented in Tables A1a and A1b in the Appendix.17
A potential source for the observed overdispersion is the fact that 30% of all observations
in our data are zeros, i.e., country-year pairs without any MS acquisitions. This fraction of zeros
is higher than assumed by Poisson and even higher than assumed by negative binomial models. It
is possible that at least some of the zeros in our data are “false zeros” and are due to imperfect
data reporting, especially in smaller and developing countries. Moreover, it is highly likely that data
collection has improved over time so we have more false zeros in earlier years. To account for the
problem we will therefore use a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model, which, in addition to
the count component that estimates the full range of the counts, also contains a binary component
that estimates the probability of excess zeros. The binary component, sometimes called the inflation
equation, is conventionally computed using the following logit process:
Pr(MSit = 0|Zit) = exp(βZit)
1 + exp(βZit)
,
where Zit is a vector of variables that may or may not coincide with variables used in the count
component.18 In our case, we include in Zit three time dummies, for the periods 1990-1995, 1996-
2000, and 2000-2013, as well as real GDP, real GDP per capita, and the size of the stock market.
The last three variables are meant to capture the degree to which the country is developed, since we
expect more developed countries to have fewer false zeros due to data collection problems.19 The
tests presented in Tables A1a and T1b in the Appendix indicate that the ZINB model fits the data
best. In the Appendix we also present results for the standard negative binomial models (without
zero-inflation); these models also provide a good fit to the data, though the results are similar to
the ZINB models presented in the main text.
3 The Data
We constructed the data set used to study the relationship between the introduction of a national
LP and MS acquisitions in several steps, outlined in Table A2 in the Appendix. First, we extracted
from Thomson One Financial database information on all acquisitions with a final stake under 50%
in 63 countries for the period 1990-2013. Second, we eliminated acquisitions for which the final stake
is unknown to ensure that we only study MS acquisitions. Third, we eliminated share buybacks and
16The Poisson model assumes that the conditional variance and mean are equidispersed, i.e., V ar(y|x) = E(y|x).
However in our case, the Pearson dispersion statistic - the standard statistic for measuring dispersion - is approximately
4 when we estimate the models by Poisson, i.e., the variation in our data is four times larger than it should be under
the Poisson assumption.
17The tests are based on information criteria and Likelihood-ratio test for nested and Vuong test for non-nested
models. They show that the fit of Poisson models is very poor compared to negative binomial models.
18The inflation equation may also include predictors other than the count process (see, e.g., Hilbe, 2007, p. 74).
19We also experimented with other variables and other time periods, but the results did not change by much.
We also included year fixed effects, but the estimation did not converge; hence we decided to use three time periods
instead.
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self-tenders, i.e., acquisitions where the acquirer and target are one and the same. In the fourth
and fifth steps, we eliminated acquisitions where the acquirer or target are investors and investment
offices according to their primary business description. These acquisitions are likely to be driven by
investment considerations, which are unrelated to the issue that we focus on in this paper. Sixth,
we eliminated from most of our analysis cross-border acquisitions, because in such acquisitions it
is not clear which competition authority is in charge and hence which LP is relevant. Seventh, we
also eliminated from most of our analysis non-horizontal acquisitions. An acquisition is classified
as horizontal if the listed activities of the acquirer (or its parent company) and the target overlap
in at least one 4-digit SIC code. Without an overlap, we classify the transaction as non-horizontal.
Our final data covers 14, 112 domestic horizontal MS acquisitions, of which 11, 714 are new MS
acquisitions, and 2, 398 are increases of an already existing MS. In some of our robustness checks,
we will also examine domestic non-horizontal MS and cross-border horizontal MS.
Our main dependent variables are two measures of MS acquisitions: the number of MS
acquisitions in country i and year t, and the aggregate deal volume of MS acquisitions in country i and
year t, measured in millions of constant 1990 USD. These were computed using GDP deflator data
for the US provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with 1990 as the base year. Figure
1 below shows the annual total number of transactions and aggregate volume of MS acquisitions over
all countries for the period 1990 and 2013. It is worth noting that the number of MS acquisitions
and their aggregate volume have an increasing time trend with peaks in 2000 (the dotcom bubble)
and in 2009 (the global financial crisis).20 In our analysis, we will therefore include time fixed effects
to control for these trends.
Figure 1: Number and aggregate volume of MS acquisitions (in million USD,
1990-2013)
20The increasing trend in the data might be due to improvements in the scope and quality of the used database.
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Of the countries in our data, the U.S. accounts for the largest aggregate volume of transac-
tions, with about 18% of the total (75, 433 million USD out of 430, 208 million USD), while Japan
has the largest number of acquisitions, followed by the U.S. (1, 888 acquisitions in Japan and 1, 680
in the U.S. out of a total of 14, 112 MS acquisitions). The distributions of the number and aggregate
volume of MS acquisitions across countries for the period 1990-2013 are presented in Figure A1 and
A2 in the Appendix.
Of the 63 countries in our dataset, only 54 have introduced a national LP between 1993
and 2012 (Table A3 in the Appendix lists for each year, which countries have introduced an LP in
that year). Argentina, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Jordan, Nigeria, Oman, Thailand, Venezuela, and
Vietnam did not introduce an LP at least until 2013 when our data ends. The next figure shows the
distribution of years in which LPs were introduced.
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Figure 2: Frequency of the introduction of new national LP (by year)
The first countries to introduce an LP were the U.S., South Korea, and the U.K. After 2000,
we see a significant increase in the introduction of LPs, with at least three countries introducing an
LP each year. The peak was reached in 2004, with nine countries adopting an LP that year.21
As mentioned earlier, an LP may be ineffective in countries with weak antitrust enforcement
and high levels of corruption. If so, the introduction of an LP should have no effect on MS acquisitions
in such countries. To control for the efficacy of antitrust enforcement, we use the Anti-Monopoly
Policy Index (AMPI), provided by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and published annually in the
Global Competition Review (GCR).22 The AMPI is based on a survey of top business executives
regarding their perception of the efficacy of antimonopoly policy in their particular country and
21The EU has introduced an LP in 1996 and revised in in 2002 and 2006. In this paper however we only focus on
national LP’s. Including the EU’s LP and its revisions in the regressions does not change our qualitative results.
22The AMPI is part of a much broader Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which can be downloaded at
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/ (last accessed on 24 June 2017). For
the construction of AMPI, we use the variable “6.03 Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy.”
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varies from 1 (not effective at all) to 7 (extremely effective). The average AMPI values for the
countries in our data set are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. Although the AMPI is based on
a single survey question and hence is unlikely to capture different dimensions of competition law
and policy, we chose it over other popular measures, such as the GCR Rating Enforcement measure
(RE),23 because of its wide coverage, which allows us to include it for 62 out of 63 countries in our
data. Despite its simplicity, the AMPI is highly correlated with the RE measure, with a correlation
coefficient of 0.7. We therefore believe that the AMPI is a sensible measure of antitrust enforcement.
Since the AMPI is only available from 2006 onwards, we divide countries into two groups,
depending on their average AMPI’s during the 2006-2013 period. Countries with an average AMPI
above the median for all countries are classified as having an effective antitrust enforcement, while
countries with an average AMPI below the median are classified as having an ineffective antitrust
enforcement. This classification is justified by the fact the AMPI scores are stable over time.
We control for corruption using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), computed annually
by Transparency International (TI). The CPI is based on survey-type assessments by analysts,
businessmen, and experts and reflects the perceived level of corruption in the public sectors of their
country. It rates countries on a 10 points scale, with a higher score reflecting a lower level of
corruption.24 The average CPI values for the countries in our data set are shown in Table A3 in
the Appendix. Unfortunately, we do not have CPI scores for all country-year pairs since CPI were
originally available only for 28 countries out of the 63 countries in our sample and is available only
for 42 countries from 2003 onwards. We therefore exploit the fact that the CPI for each country is
stable over time, and as in the AMPI case, classify countries as having either a low or a high level
of corruption, depending on whether their average CPI scores are below or above the median for all
countries.
To control for other potential determinants of MS acquisitions, we collected country-specific
macroeconomic variables, including GDP growth, real GDP per capita, unemployment rate, inflation
rate (based on the GDP deflator index), and the purchasing-power-parity conversion rate (PPPEX).
These variables were shown to be potential drivers of mergers and acquisitions (see, e.g., Rossi and
Volpin (2003), Di Giovanni (2005) and Erel et al. (2012)). We also include a real GDP variable to
control for country size, and the growth rate of the volume of import (IMP) and exports (EXP) of
goods and services to reflect year-over-year changes in trade activity. All these variables are taken
from the World Economic Outlook Database (WEO) provided by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and are available for all countries in our data except India and Oman.
In addition to the macroeconomic control variables, we also include in the analysis country-
specific financial markets variables from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
23The RE measure is based on a detailed questionnaire filled by the competition authorities themselves (e.g. size
of the authority, their methodologies for setting priorities and ensuring transparency as well as a detailed breakdown
of the number and the handling of merger filings and their cartel and abuse of dominance work). In addition, the
RE measure also considers how local competition counsels, antitrust lawyers and economists, academics, and local
journalists evaluate an agency’s performance. However, the RE measure is only available for a fraction of the countries
used in our analysis.
24For further information on the CPI, see http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (last accessed on
24 June 2017).
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These variables include the total market capitalization of listed firms as a share of the GDP to
control for the size of the stock market (STOCK); domestic credit to private sector as a share of the
GDP to control for the availability of credit (CREDIT); the trade ratio as the share of total imports
and exports in GDP to control for trade activity (TRADE); and the real interest rate, which is the
lending interest rate adjusted for inflation, to control for the real cost of investment (INTEREST).
Unfortunately, the financial markets variables (and especially CREDIT and INTEREST) are not
available for all country-year pairs and hence when we use them, our sample is reduced from 1, 368
to 1, 018 country-year pairs.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our variables, reported on an annual basis.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Source
No. of MS acquisitions 8.62 19.1 0 189 1500 Thomson
No. of new MS acquisitions 7.13 15.4 0 151 1500 Thomson
Aggregate volume of MS acquisitions 144 380 0 4225 1500 Thomson
Aggregate volume of new MS acquisitions 112 309 0 3929 1500 Thomson
Real GDP 4.85 1.6 0.39 9.24 1477 IMF
GDP growth 0.03 0.0 -0.23 0.24 1468 IMF
Real GDP per capita (in m USD) 8.83 1.3 4.59 11.2 1473 IMF
Unemployment (% of Labor Force) 7.95 4.6 0.03 27.8 1397 IMF
Inflation (%) 28.3 230 -25.70 5053 1466 IMF
Purchasing-power-parity conversion rate (PPPEX) 115 530.9 0.00 7311 1472 IMF
Volume of exports of goods and services (EXP) 7.58 7.9 -26.6 77.5 1451 IMF
Volume of imports of goods and services (IMP) 9.81 17.1 -41.6 507 1453 IMF
Credit (% of GDP) 73.5 50.9 1.12 311 1373 WDI
Interest rate (%) 5.89 11.3 -91.7 93.9 1190 WDI
Stock (% of GDP) 59.5 64.9 0.00 606 1375 WDI
Trade (% of GDP) 85.5 65.6 13.8 450 1437 WDI
Anti-Monopoly Policy Index (AMPI, 1-7) 4.51 0.7 2.84 5.77 1476 TI
Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 1-10) 6.25 2.2 2.44 9.48 996 WEF
Notes: All variables reflecting a percentage are scaled to 100 for 100%; Volumes of acquisitions and GDP are
measured in constant 1990 million USD; GDP growth and imports and exports are measured in year-on-year
percentage changes.
Table 1 shows that on average, there are 8.6 national horizontal MS acquisitions per country
per year, of which 7.1 are new acquisitions. The average aggregate deal volume is 144 million USD
for all acquisitions, and 112 million USD for new acquisitions. Both the number and volume of
MS acquisitions have a large variance. In particular, in 30% of all country-year pairs in our data
there are no MS acquisitions, while in other country-year pairs there is a large number and a large
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volume of MS acquisitions. The table also shows a large diversity across countries in terms of the
macroeconomic and the financial market variables: for example, the average unemployment rate
ranges from 0.3% (Switzerland, 1990) to 27.8% percent (South Africa, 2002), inflation rates vary
from −26% (Oman, 2009) to more than 5, 000% (Peru, 1990), credit ranges from 1.1% of GDP (the
Slovak Republic in 2006) to 311% of GDP (Iceland in 2006), and the real interest rate ranges from
−92% (Ukraine in 1993) to 94% (Bulgaria in 1996).25
Before moving to the estimation results, we first illustrate in Figure 3 the evolution of the
number and aggregate volume of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions from three years before the
introduction of a national LP to three years after. To make the data comparable across countries,
we normalize the data for each country to values between 0 and 1, as follows:
MSnormit =
MSit −min (MSi)
max (MSi)−min (MSi) ,
where min (MSi) and max (MSi) are the lowest and highest value of MSit for country i over the
sample period. Cyprus, Ecuador, Taiwan and Ukraine are not included in the figure since they
introduced a national LP only in 2011 and 2012, respectively, so we do not have observations on full
three years after the LP was introduced (we have data only until 2013).
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Figure 3: Development of MS acquisitions in the three years before and after the
introduction of national leniency programs (normalized by country, 0-1)
25Some values in Table 1 are extreme, like the minimum value of GDP growth of −920.7, which correspondes to
Bulgaria in 1991, immediately after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.
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Figure 3 shows that the number of MS acquisitions, as well as their aggregate volume,
increase as we approach the year in which an LP is introduced (this year is different for different
countries) and then decrease. This trend suggests that the introduction of an LP encourages MS
acquisitions in rivals. In the next section, we show that this pattern persists even after we control
for various factors that may affect MS acquisitions, and use year fixed effects.
4 Estimation Results
We present our estimation results for the number of new domestic MS acquisitions in rivals and their
aggregate deal volumes Tables 2 and 3 below. The results are obtained from ZINB estimation. In
the online Appendix, we present corresponding results from negative binomial estimation; the results
are very similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. In all specifications, we include country and year fixed
effects. In most of the paper we only focus on new MS acquisitions in domestic rivals. Including
increases of already existing MS shareholdings in rivals, yields very similar results, especially for the
number of MS acquisitions. The results for this case are also in the online Appendix.
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Table 2: ZINB estimations of the number of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LP-3 -0.01 0.02
(0.13) (0.13)
LP-2 -0.07 -0.09
(0.11) (0.12)
LP-1 0.05 0.01
(0.12) (0.12)
LP 0.23 ∗∗ 0.26 ∗∗ 0.23 ∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
LP+1 0.07 0.09
(0.12) (0.13)
LP+2 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.14)
LP+3 0.04 0.03
(0.12) (0.13)
LP x Effective Enforcement 0.35 ∗∗∗
(0.14)
LP x Ineffective Enforcement 0.01
(0.18)
LP x Low Corruption 0.41 ∗∗
(0.18)
LP x High Corruption -0.26
(0.46)
After LP -0.01
(0.16)
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test on joint significance of covariates 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.67
Observations 1368 1018 1008 652 1018
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomic covariates are GDP, GDP growth,
GDP per capita, Unenmployment rate, Inflation, PPPEX, IMP and EXP. The financial covariates are
CREDIT, INTEREST, STOCK and Trade. All covariates are lagged by one year. The full estimation
outputs are available in the online Appendix of the paper. The reported R2is the deviance based R2suggested
by Cameron and Windmeijer (1996). ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 show that the number of new domestic horizontal MS
acquisitions increases significantly by 26% − 30% in the year in which an LP was introduced.26
Note that Column (1) does not include the financial market variables, which are not available for
all country-year pairs, and therefore has more observations. Yet the results in Columns (1) and
(2) are very similar. The increase in the number of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions is
consistent with the idea that firms acquires MS in rivals to stabilize collusive arrangements that
were destabilized by the introduction of an LP. Alternatively, it could be that firms anticipate that
the LP will lead to a collapse of their collusive agreement, so they acquire MS in rivals in order to
make the non-collusive equilibrium that will prevail less competitive.
In Column (5) we examine this issue further by replacing the before/after LP year dummies
with a single “After LP” dummy that takes the value 1 in all years after an LP was introduced and
0 otherwise (including the year in which the LP was introduced). The idea is to examine whether an
LP has a permanent effect on MS acquisitions. It turns out, however, that the “After LP” dummy is
not significant, suggesting that the effect of LP on MS is indeed limited to the year at which the LP
was introduced. A potential reason for this is that an LP may deter new cartels from being formed,
and hence firms do not need to acquire MS in rivals either. Yet, firms need to stabilize their existing
collusive agreements once an LP is introduced, and hence they respond quickly to the introduction
of the LP by acquiring MS in the year in which the LP is first introduced.
In Columns (3) and (4), we interact the LP dummy with the AMPI and the CPI to control
for the efficacy of antitrust enforcement. Since the AMPI and CPI are not available for all country-
year pairs, we have fewer observations in Columns (3) and especially (4). The results show that the
effect of the introduction of an LP on MS acquisitions is limited to countries with effective antitrust
enforcement and low levels of corruption. The effect in these countries is in fact much larger than
it is for the entire set of countries: the number of MS acquisitions in these countries is 42% − 51%
higher in the year an LP is introduced than in other years.27 The finding that the introduction of
an LP affects MS acquisitions only in countries with effective antitrust enforcement and low levels
of corruption is consistent with the idea that when antitrust enforcement is weak and/or the level
of corruption is high, an LP is either unlikely to be effective in destabilizing collusive agreements or
collusion is feasible even without the need to acquire MS in rivals. Hence, the introduction of an LP
has no effect on new MS acquisitions in such countries.
We now turn to the aggregate deal volume of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions. The
results are presented in Table 3.
26The exponentiated coefficients of 0.23 in Column (1) and 0.26 in Column (2) are 1.26 and 1.30, and therefore
represent an increase of 26% and 30% in MS acquisitions in the year an LP was introduced.
27The exponentiated coefficients of 0.35 in Column (3) and 0.41 in Column (4) are 1.42 and 1.51.
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Table 3: ZINB estimations of the aggregate volume of new domestic horizontal
MS acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LP-3 0.15 0.10
(0.46) (0.43)
LP-2 0.01 -0.00
(0.32) (0.36)
LP-1 -0.23 -0.26
(0.35) (0.40)
LP 0.56 ∗∗ 0.71 ∗∗ 0.93 ∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.39)
LP+1 0.26 0.56 ∗∗
(0.25) (0.23)
LP+2 0.30 0.42
(0.27) (0.26)
LP+3 0.35 0.29
(0.38) (0.45)
LP x Effective Enforcement 1.14 ∗∗∗
(0.44)
LP x Ineffective Enforcement -0.26
(0.48)
LP x Low Corruption 0.89 ∗∗
(0.38)
LP x High Corruption -0.36
(0.51)
After LP 0.63 ∗
(0.33)
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test on joint significance of covariates 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36
Observations 1368 1018 1008 652 1018
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. Covariates are included as in Table 2 but not reported.
∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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The results in Table 3 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2. The coefficients of
the leniency dummy in Columns (1) and (2) indicate a 75% − 103% increase in the aggregate deal
volume of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions in the year at which the LP is introduced.28 Moreover,
Column (2) shows that the aggregate deal volume of MS acquisitions also increases in the first year
after the introduction of the LP.
Note that the LP coefficient is much larger in Table 3 than in Table 2, indicating that the
introduction of an LP has a much larger effect on the deal volume of MS acquisitions than on their
sheer number. That is, after an LP is in place, firms pay on average more money for MS stakes in
rivals. There are two potential reasons for this: (i) firms may buy larger stakes in rivals once an
LP is introduced and hence they pay more, and (ii) firms may acquire stakes in larger rivals, which
require higher payments.
Before we examine this issue in detail, we first take a closer look at the size of MS stakes
that firms acquire. To this end, we split the MS acquisitions in our data into five groups, depending
on the size of the acquired stake: up to 10%, 10%− 20%, 20%− 30%, 30%− 40%, and 40%− 50%.
Table 4 shows the distribution of MS acquisitions by the size of the acquired stake in millions of
USD.
Table 4: Size intervals of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions (1990-2013)
Size Number % Number MS % Volume New MS % Volume MS Increases %
Interval New MS Increases (in m USD) (in m USD)
0 - 10% 2,345 20 1,201 50 35,684 21 20,985 44
10 - 20% 2,899 25 745 31 40,700 24 13,412 28
20 - 30% 2,537 22 308 13 35,497 21 8,289 17
30 - 40% 1,775 15 90 4 25,633 15 3,700 8
40 - 50% 1,948 17 23 1 31,204 18 1,101 2
Total 11,504 100 2,398 100 168,718 100 47,587 100
Table 4 shows that the number of new MS acquisitions and their volume are by and large
evenly split among the five groups, though acquisitions of 10%− 20% stakes are more common than
acquisitions of large stakes of 30% or more. With MS increases, the majority of acquisitions are of
less than 20% and especially less than 10%.29 Since we restrict attention to financial stakes under
50%, the latter result is not surprising since the acquired stakes are constrained by the size of the
exsisting stakes (for example, a firm that already holds 20% in a rival can acquire at most 30%
without turning its stake into a majority stake).
28The exponentiated coefficients of 0.56 in Column (1) and 0.71 in Column (2) are equal to 1.75 and 2.03.
29If we consider the final stake of the acquirer after the acquisition rather than the size of the acquired stake, then
9% of all acquisitions have a final stake of up to 10%, 24% have a final stake of 10%− 20%, 24% have a final stake of
20%− 30%, 21% have a final stake of 30%− 40%, and 22% have a final stake of 40%− 50%. The median size of the
initial stake before the acquisition of an additional stake is around 13%.
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Table 5: ZINB estimations of the number of new domestic horizontal MS
acquisitions by stake size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0-10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50%
LP-3 -0.25 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.19
(0.24) (0.23) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12)
LP-2 -0.19 0.00 0.16 -0.18 -0.32
(0.16) (0.19) (0.13) (0.21) (0.20)
LP-1 -0.17 0.23 -0.12 -0.21 -0.10
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21)
LP 0.13 0.53 ∗∗∗ -0.09 -0.28 0.20
(0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.22)
LP+1 0.14 0.18 0.08 0.16 0.06
(0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16)
LP+2 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.30 ∗∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14)
LP+3 0.22 0.23 0.04 -0.06 -0.04
(0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18)
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.51
Observations 1018 1018 1018 1018 1018
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomc and financial covariates are as in
Table 2. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
In Table 5, we present results from estimating the same specification as in Column (2) in
Table 2, but now separately for each of the five size groups. The results show that in the year an LP
is introduced, the effect on new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions is concentrated on acquisitions
of a 10% − 20% stake in rivals, but not in other size groups. Stakes that are under 20% typically
do not trigger merger notification and hence can go “under the radar.” Clearly, colluding firms
would prefer such stakes over larger stakes that do trigger merger notification and antitrust scrutiny.
Interestingly, we also find a significant effect for larger acquisitions of 40%−50% two years after the
introduction of an LP. It turns out that this effect is driven by MS acquisitions in the U.S.: once
the U.S. is dropped from the sample, the effect disappears.30
We now turn to the question posed earlier: why is there an increase in the volume of MS
30The U.S. adjusted their 1993 LP in 1995 (see Sovinsky and Helland (2012)). Of the 1, 948 MS acquisitions which
involve stakes of 40%− 50% (see Table 4), 202 are from the U.S.
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acquisitions after an LP is introduced? Is this because, on average, firms acquire larger stakes in
rivals, or because, on average, they acquire stakes in larger rivals? To provide an answer, we begin by
studying the effect that the introduction of an LP has on the aggregate MS stake that firms acquire
in domestic rivals. That is, the dependent variable now is the unweighted sum of all acquired stakes
in country i and year t. For example, if there are two MS acquisitions in country i in year t, one
of a 10% stake and the other of a 30% stake, then the aggregate stake size is 40%. The estimates,
presented in Table A4 in the Appendix, suggest that despite the increase in the number and volume
of domestic horizontal MS acquisitions, the introduction of an LP does not have a significant effect
on the aggregate stake which is acquired (the effect is significant only in Column (1) where we do
not control for financial covariates). Hence, the increase in the volume of MS acquisitions is not due
to acquisitions of larger stakes once an LP is in place.
Having ruled out the possibility that firms acquire larger stakes, we now examine the possi-
bility that once an LP is in place, firms acquire stakes in larger rivals. To this end, we measure the
size of the target firms in terms of their market capitalization, which is defined as follows:
Market Cap = 100 × Deal volume
Acquired stake
.
We then split the target firms into two groups, small and large, depending on whether their
market capitalization is below or above the median of all target firms in their country. The results
appear in Table 6. The dependent variable is the number of MS acquisitions in small rivals in
Columns (1)-(4) and in large rivals in Columns (5)-(8).
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Table 6: ZINB estimations of the number of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions by
rival size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Small Firms Large Firms
LP-3 0.09 0.05
(0.17) (0.13)
LP-2 0.09 -0.14
(0.16) (0.14)
LP-1 0.13 -0.05
(0.15) (0.13)
LP -0.01 -0.08 0.32 ∗∗ 0.35 ∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
LP+1 0.11 0.12
(0.14) (0.13)
LP+2 0.06 0.17
(0.21) (0.13)
LP+3 -0.04 0.08
(0.15) (0.14)
LP x Effective Enforcement 0.01 0.40 ∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.14)
LP x Ineffective Enforcement -0.20 0.02
(0.26) (0.22)
LP x Low Corruption 0.14 0.46 ∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.17)
LP x High Corruption 0.03 -0.48∗
(0.33) (0.26)
After LP -0.06 0.10
(0.18) (0.16)
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.66
Observations 1018 1008 652 1018 1018 1008 652 1018
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomic and financial covariates are as in
Table 2. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table 6 shows that in the year in which a national LP is introduced, there is a significant
increase in the number of MS acquisitions in large rivals, but not in small ones. Columns (6)-(7)
show that the effect is present only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low
levels of corruption. Column (8) shows that the effect is present only in the year in which the LP
is introduced, but not in subsequent years. The finding that the introduction of an LP encourages
acquisitions of stakes in large rivals is consistent with Hellwig and Hu¨schelrath (2016), who find that
large firms are often involved in cartel activity, and with Hoang et al. (2014), who find that large
cartel members are most likely to become the chief witness under an LP. Unfortunately, we do not
observe the size of the acquirers and therefore cannot investigate whether the introduction of LP
also affects the acquirer’s size.
5 Robustness Checks
We now report some robustness checks. We begin by looking at whether, beside its effect on new
domestic horizontal (DH) MS acquisitions, the introduction of an LP also affected new domestic non-
horizontal (DNH) MS acquisitions (the acquirer and the target do not have any overlap in their SIC
codes), new cross-border horizontal (CBH) MS acquisitions, and new cross-border non-horizontal
(CBNH) MS acquisitions. To this end, we now estimate the same model as before, except that we
also add, separately each time, observations on DNH, CBH, and CBNH MS acquisitions, as a control
group. We then estimate the following model for the number of new MS acquisitions:
MSit = exp(α1(LPit ×DH) +α2(LPit ×CG) + γDH + βXit + ξi + ξt + εit),
where DH is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the observation for a certain country-year pair
refers to new horizontal domestic MS acquisition and 0 otherwise, and CG = 1 − DH. We then
estimate this model separately for each type of a control group. The results regarding the number
of new MS acquisitions are reported in Table 7 below.31 In Column (1), the control group is DNH
MS acquisitions, in Columns (2)-(3) it is CBH MS acquisitions, and in Columns (4)-(5) it is CBNH
MS acquisitions. In the case of cross-border acquisitions, we examine separately cases in which the
introduction of an LP is in the target’s country (Columns (2) and (4)) and in which it is in the
acquirer’s country (Columns (3) and (5)).
The results show that the introduction of an LP has a significant effect only on domestic
horizontal MS acquisitions, but not on other types of MS acquisitions. This finding is consistent
with the idea that domestic horizontal MS acquisitions are driven, at least partly, by the desire to
stabilize domestic collusive agreements.
31We also used the volume of MS acquisitions as a dependent variable. The results, available in an online Appendix,
show that an LP has a significant positive effect only in the year it is introduced or one year after, but only in the
case of domestic horizontal acquiesitions. An LP has no effect on domestic non-horizontal, cross-border horizontal, or
cross-border non-horizontal MS aquisitions.
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Table 7: ZINB estimations for the number of new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions
(DH) with different control groups (CG)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CG is: DNH CBH (LP in
target country)
CBH (LP in
acquirer
country)
CBNH (LP in
target country)
CBNH (LP in
acquirer
country)
LP - 3 × DH 0.04 (0.14) 0.08 (0.15) 0.02 (0.16) 0.05 (0.18) 0.01 (0.16)
LP - 2 × DH -0.06 (0.17) -0.04 (0.15) -0.06 (0.15) -0.05 (0.22) -0.07 (0.15)
LP - 1 × DH 0.05 (0.13) 0.08 (0.13) 0.07 (0.13) 0.05 (0.11) 0.06 (0.14)
LP × DH 0.30 ∗∗ (0.13) 0.30 ∗∗ (0.14) 0.30 ∗∗ (0.13) 0.27 ∗ (0.14) 0.30 ∗∗ (0.14)
LP + 1 × DH 0.16 (0.14) 0.25 ∗ (0.15) 0.11 (0.14) 0.16 (0.15) 0.11 (0.14)
LP + 2 × DH 0.16 (0.16) 0.27 ∗ (0.16) 0.13 (0.16) 0.18 (0.16) 0.13 (0.16)
LP + 3 × DH 0.06 (0.16) 0.18 (0.15) 0.05 (0.16) 0.12 (0.15) 0.05 (0.16)
LP - 3 × CG 0.01 (0.14) 0.12 (0.13) 0.05 (0.15) 0.31 (0.22) 0.02 (0.14)
LP - 2 × CG 0.08 (0.14) 0.13 (0.13) -0.07 (0.11) 0.04 (0.28) -0.07 (0.11)
LP - 1 × CG 0.05 (0.15) -0.24 (0.16) -0.11 (0.15) 0.13 (0.13) -0.11 (0.14)
LP × CG 0.04 (0.21) -0.14 (0.14) -0.03 (0.12) 0.07 (0.16) -0.02 (0.12)
LP + 1 × CG 0.02 (0.17) -0.11 (0.14) -0.09 (0.14) -0.03 (0.17) -0.10 (0.13)
LP + 2 × CG 0.15 (0.18) -0.20 (0.13) 0.01 (0.14) 0.06 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14)
LP + 3 × CG -0.01 (0.18) -0.10 (0.12) -0.14 (0.14) -0.09 (0.13) -0.16 (0.14)
DH -0.39∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.08 (0.10) 0.61 ∗∗∗ (0.17) 0.32 ∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.59 ∗∗∗ (0.17)
Macro cov. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial cov. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.68 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.65
Observations 2036 2036 2036 2036 2036
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. All specifications include year and country fixed effects. Inflation
equation appears in the online Appendix. The macroeconomic and financial covariates are as in Columns
(2)-(5) of Table 2. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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One might be concerned that our results are driven either by the large number of LP
introductions in 2004 or by the fact that many MS acquisitions in our data come from three countries:
the U.S., Japan, and Spain. We therefore re-estimate Table 2, but now drop from the sample MS
acquisitions from the nine countries that introduced a national LP in 2004 (Belgium, Finland, Latvia,
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, South Africa and Switzerland). We then repeat the
exercise by dropping from the sample MS acquisitions from the U.S., Japan, and Spain. The results,
presented in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix, show that our results are not driven by specific
years or specific countries: the introduction of an LP still has a significant positive effect on domestic
horizontal MS acquisitions in the year in which the LP is introduced but not in other years.
Finally, we ran a placebo test by assigning a random year for the introduction of a national
LP for each country in the dataset. We repeat this procedure 1, 000 times to get 1, 000 randomized
LP samples. For each sample, we run specification (2) of our baseline regressions presented in Tables
2-3 and save the relevant coefficients. We then compare the coefficient with those obtained from the
true LP introduction. In Figure 4, we report the distribution of the coefficients (left-hand charts)
and the p-values (right-hand charts) for our two dependent variables. The vertical red lines represent
the actual coefficient of the true sample in the left-hand charts, and the p-value in the right-hand
charts.
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Figure 4: Random samples - Number of new MS and Aggregate volume of new MS
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6 Conclusion
Recently, antitrust authorities began paying attention to MS among rival firms. For example, the Eu-
ropean Commission started a public consultation in 2013 (European Commission, 2014) on whether
acquisition of non-controlling MS should be notified and examined by the Commission.32 The con-
cern is that MS acquisitions give rise to unilateral and coordinated anticompetitive effects. There
is already some evidence that MS acquisitions may harm competition. The question of course is
whether this is due to unilateral or coordinated effects.
In this paper, we study the latter possibility and examine whether MS acquisitions are likely
to facilitate collusion. To this end, we exploit the fact that the introduction of an LP is a negative
shock that destabilize collusive agreements. Firms may react to this negative shock by acquiring MS
in rivals either in order to stabilize their collusive agreements, or to soften competition if collusion
is going to break down. Consistent with this idea, we find that the introduction of an LP is followed
by a significant increase in the number of MS acquisitions and in their volume. This effect is present
however only in countries with an effective antitrust enforcement and low levels of corruption, where
the introduction of an LP is indeed likely to destabilize collusive agreements. Moreover, we find that
the increase in MS acquisitions is significant when it comes to large rivals (i.e., targets with above-
median market capitalization) and when the acquisitions involve stakes of 10%−20%. As mentioned
earlier, typically such stakes do not trigger merger notification, and hence allows colluding firms to
stay “under the radar.”
As far as we know, our paper is the first to provide evidence for the collusive effect of MS
acquisitions. While there is already a theoretical literature that shows that MS acquisitions can
facilitate collusion, so far this possibility did not receive an empirical support. Our results suggest
that MS acquisitions are potentially anticompetitive, especially when it comes to acquisitions of
intermediate levels of MS stakes in large rivals and hence it would be a good idea to incorporate
them into the merger control procedures, as is done, to some extent, in some countries like Austria,
Germany, or the UK.
32For further information on the EU Merger Control process, please see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ mergers/
procedures en.html (last accessed on 24 June 2017).
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A Appendix
The following two tables report results from model choice tests suggesting which model should be
prefered over another. In particular Poisson and Negative Binomial models as well as their zero-
inflated counterparts are compared. In addition to the Akaike and the Bayesian Information Criteria
(AIC and BIC, a lower value means a better model fit and should be preferred) we also report the
Likelihood-Ratio (LRX2)) for nested models and the the Vuong Test for non-nested models.
Table A1a: Tests and statistics of the model fit for the number of new new
domestic horizontal MS acquisitions
Poisson BIC= 8137 AIC= 7620 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NegBin BIC= 6437 dif= 1699 NegBin Poisson Very strong
AIC= 5915 dif= 1705 NegBin Poisson
LRX2= 1707 prob= 0 NegBin Poisson p=0.00
vs ZIP BIC= 8023 dif= 114 ZIP Poisson Very strong
AIC= 7480 dif= 140 ZIP Poisson
Vuong= 3.00 prob= 0 ZIP Poisson p=0.00
vs ZINB BIC= 6455 dif= 1682 ZINB Poisson Very strong
AIC= 5907 dif= 1713 ZINB Poisson
NegBin BIC= 6437 AIC= 5915 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZIP BIC= 8023 dif= 1585 NegBin ZIP Very strong
AIC= 7480 dif= 1565 NegBin ZIP
vs ZINB BIC= 6455 dif= -18 NegBin ZINB Very strong
AIC= 5907 dif= 8 ZINB NegBin
Vuong= 1.63 prob= 0.05 ZINB NegBin p=0.05
ZIP BIC= 8023 AIC= 7480 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC= 6455 dif= 1568 ZINB ZIP Very strong
AIC= 5907 dif= 1573 ZINB ZIP
LRX2= 1575 prob= 0 ZINB ZIP p=0.00
Notes: AIC and BIC present test statistics from Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, LRX2 presents the
results from boundary likelihood-ratio tests and Vuong represents the results from Vuong tests. NegBin, ZIP
and ZINB abbreviate negative binomial, the zero-inflated Poisson and the zero-inflated negative binomial
models. The program Countfit by Long and Freese (2014) is applied for the computation of tests and fit
statistics.
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Table A1b: Test and statistics of the model fit for the aggregate volume of new
domestic horizontal MS acqusitions
Poisson BIC=160750 AIC=160233 Prefer Over Evidence
vs NegBin BIC= 10633 dif=150117 NegBin Poisson Very strong
AIC= 10111 dif=150122 NegBin Poisson
LRX2 = 1.50e+05 prob= 0.00 NegBin Poisson p=0.00
vs ZIP BIC=127051 dif= 33699 ZIP Poisson Very strong
AIC=126508 dif= 33725 ZIP Poisson
Vuong= 11.17 prob= 0.00 ZIP Poisson p=0.00
vs ZINB BIC= 10528 dif=150221 ZINB Poisson Very strong
AIC= 9980 dif=150253 ZINB Poisson
NegBin BIC= 10633 AIC= 10111 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZIP BIC=127051 dif=-1.164e+05 NegBin ZIP Very strong
AIC=126508 dif=-1.164e+05 NegBin ZIP
vs ZINB BIC= 10528 dif= 105 ZINB NegBin Very strong
AIC= 9980 dif= 131 ZINB NegBin
Vuong= 8.18 prob= 0.00 ZINB NegBin p=0.00
ZIP BIC=127051 AIC=126508 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZINB BIC= 10528 dif=116522 ZINB ZIP Very strong
AIC= 9979 dif=116528 ZINB ZIP
LRX2= 1.17e+05 prob= 0.00 ZINB ZIP p=0.00
Notes: AIC and BIC present test statistics from Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, LRX2 presents the
results from boundary likelihood-ratio tests and Vuong represents the results from Vuong tests. NegBin, ZIP
and ZINB abbreviate negative binomial, the zero-inflated Poisson and the zero-inflated negative binomial
models. The program countfit by Long and Freese (2014) is applied for the computation of tests and fit
statistics.
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Data construction
The following table shows how we constructed the data set that we use in the paper and the number
of observations that remained after each step.
Table A2: Construction of the data set on new domestic horizontal MS acquisitions
Step Action # remaining observations
1 All acquisitions in 63 countries during the period 1990-2013,
where the final stake remains below 50% 131,188
2 Eliminate all acquisitions for which the final stake is not known 86,432
3 Eliminate share buybacks and self-tenders 78,897
4 Eliminate acquisitions where the acquirer is an investor 49,495
5 Eliminate acquisitions where the target is an investor 47,908
6 Eliminate cross-border acquisitions 32,864
7 Eliminate non-horizontal acquisitions 13,871
8 Eliminate increases of already existing MS 11,504
Cross country data
This subscetion contains data about the number and deal volume of MS acquisitions and also
information regarding the year in which an LP was introduced in each country and statistics about
the efficacy of antitrust enforcement and the level of corruption. We begin with the following figures
that show the distribution of the number of MS acquisitions and their aggregate deal volume by
country for the period 1990-2013.
Figure A1: Number of MS acquisitions, new acquisitions and stake increases
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Figure A2: Volume of MS acquisitions, in million USD, new acquisitions and share
increases
The next table shows for each country when an LP was introduced (before 2013), if at all.
This information is largely taken from Dong et al. (2016). In addition, the table also shows for each
country the Anti-Monopoly Policy Index (AMPI) score provided by the World Economic Forum
(WEF) and published annually in the Global Competition Review (GCR), and the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) score computed by Transparency International (TI). As mentioned earlier,
the AMPI score is on a 1-7 scale, with 7 being the most effective enforcement. The CPI score is on
a 1-10 scale, with 10 being the lowest level of corruption.
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Table A3: Country-specific information on leniency programs and enforcement
Country Leniency AMPI CPI Country Leniency AMPI CPI
Argentina No LP 3.2 . Luxembourg 2004 5.1 8.5
Australia 2003 5.3 8.6 Malaysia 2010 4..7 .
Austria 2006 5.2 7.8 Mexico 2006 3.5 3.4
Belgium 2004 5.2 6.9 Netherlands 2002 5.8 8.8
Brazil 2000 4.5 3.7 New Zealand 2004 5.5 9.4
Bulgaria 2003 3.3 3.8 Nigeria No LP 3.9 .
Canada 2000 5.1 8.8 Norway 2005 5.4 8.7
Chile 2009 4.9 . Oman No LP 4.4 .
China 2008 4.1 3.3 Pakistan 2007 3.9 .
Colombia 2009 4.0 . Peru 2005 4.0 .
Croatia 2010 3.7 3.9 Philippines 2009 3.7 .
Cyprus 2011 4.7 6.1 Poland 2004 4.2 4.6
Czech Republic 2001 4.5 4.6 Portugal 2006 4.5 6.3
Denmark 2007 5.4 9.5 Romania 2004 3.7 3.4
Ecuador 2011 3.0 . Russian Fed 2007 3.3 2.4
Estonia 2002 4.6 6.2 Singapore 2006 5.3 .
Finland 2004 5.7 9.4 Slovak Rep 2001 4.2 4.2
France 2001 5.3 6.9 Slovenia 2010 4.2 6.1
Germany 2000 5.5 7.9 South Africa 2004 5.3 .
Greece 2006 4.0 4.3 South Korea 1997 4.7 4.8
Hong Kong No LP 4.2 . Spain 2008 4.5 6.3
Hungary 2003 4.1 5.0 Sweden 2002 5.7 9.2
Iceland 2005 4.8 9.0 Switzerland 2004 5.1 8.8
India 2009 4.7 3.0 Taiwan 2012 5.0 .
Indonesia No LP 4.6 . Thailand No LP 4.1 .
Ireland-Rep 2001 5.0 7.7 Turkey 2009 4.6 3.9
Israel 2005 4.5 . Ukraine 2012 3.1 .
Italy 2007 3.8 4.6 United Kingdom 1998 5.4 8.3
Japan 2005 5.3 7.1 United States 1993 5.3 7.5
Jordan No LP 4.4 . Venezuela No LP 2.8 .
Latvia 2004 4.0 4.1 Vietnam No LP . .
Lithuania 2008 3.8 4.8
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Additional tables
Table A6 shows ZINB estimations for the aggregate stake of new domestic MS acquisitions. Tables
A9-A10 are the counterparts of Tables 2 and 3 in the text, but in Table A9 we omit countries that
introduced an LP in 2004, and in Table A10 we omit countries with the largest MS activity.
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Table A4: ZINB estimations of the aggregate stake size of new domestic
horizontal MS acquisitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LP-3 0.08 0.11
(0.12) (0.13)
LP-2 -0.04 -0.03
(0.10) (0.11)
LP-1 0.03 0.01
(0.10) (0.11)
LP 0.19 ∗ 0.16 0.12
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
LP+1 0.04 0.07
(0.10) (0.11)
LP+2 0.12 0.10
(0.11) (0.13)
LP+3 -0.05 -0.02
(0.12) (0.14)
LP x Effective Enforcement 0.28 ∗∗
(0.13)
LP x Ineffective Enforcement -0.07
(0.21)
LP x Low Corruption 0.35 ∗∗
(0.18)
LP x High Corruption -0.01
(0.30)
After LP -0.04
(0.13)
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test on joint significance of covariates 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
Observations 1368 1018 1008 652 1018
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomc and financial covariates are as in
Table 2. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table A5: ZINB estimations of the number of new domestic horizontal MS
acquisitions (countries dropped if an LP was introduced in 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LP-3 0.01 0.03
(0.14) (0.14)
LP-2 -0.01 -0.01
(0.12) (0.13)
LP-1 0.05 0.03
(0.13) (0.13)
LP 0.19 ∗ 0.22 ∗ 0.18
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
LP+1 0.12 0.15
(0.13) (0.14)
LP+2 0.10 0.09
(0.15) (0.16)
LP+3 -0.02 -0.05
(0.13) (0.14)
LP x Effective Enforcement 0.28 ∗∗
(0.14)
LP x Ineffective Enforcement 0.01
(0.19)
LP x Low Corruption 0.33 ∗
(0.20)
LP x High Corruption -0.27
(0.42)
After LP -0.02
(0.17)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.66
Observations 1164 875 865 532 875
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomc and financial covariates are as in
Table 2. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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Table A6: ZINB estimations of the number of new domestic horizontal MS
acquisitions (countries with the largest MS activity are dropped)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LP-3 -0.06 -0.05
(0.15) (0.14)
LP-2 -0.13 -0.07
(0.13) (0.13)
LP-1 -0.01 0.02
(0.13) (0.12)
LP 0.19 ∗ 0.22 ∗ 0.15
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14)
LP+1 -0.06 -0.05
(0.10) (0.11)
LP+2 -0.01 -0.03
(0.12) (0.14)
LP+3 -0.08 -0.06
(0.12) (0.13)
LP x Effective Enforcement 0.36 ∗∗∗
(0.13)
LP x Ineffective Enforcement 0.02
(0.18)
LP x Low Corruption 0.40 ∗∗∗
(0.16)
LP x High Corruption -0.27
(0.25)
After LP -0.18
(0.15)
Macroeconomic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66
Observations 1296 958 948 592 958
Notes: S.E. clustered at the country-level. Inflation equation is reported in the online Appendix. All
specifications include year and country fixed effects. The macroeconomc and financial covariates are as in
Table 2. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01
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